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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
tJTAH PARKS COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant J 
vs. 
IRON COUNTY~ a Body Corporate 
and Politic, and CEDAR CITY 
CORPORATION, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 9540 
and 
No. 9753 
ANSWERING BRIEF OF 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, 
Case No. 9753 
i\RGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONSTirfUTIONALL Y ESTABLISHED 
TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF CEDAR CITY COR-
PORATION PRECI.JUDED THE LAWFUL ASSESS-
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2 
MENT AND LEVY OF TAXES FOR THE YEAR 
1958 ON THEEL ESCALANTE HOTEL PROPER-
TY CONVEYED BY UTAH PARKS COMPANY TO 
CEDAR CI1,Y CORPORATION ON JANUARY 31, 
1958, AND rfHEREFORE THE UTAH PARKS COM-
PANY IS NOT ENTITLED UNDER THE TERMS 
OF ITS DEED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM CE-
DAR CI'fY CORPORA1,ION FOR THE 1958 TAXES 
ERRONEOUSLY PAID BY UTAH PARKS COM-
PANY. 
In Point I of its brief, Utah Parks Company has 
argued that the tax upon the El Escalante Hotel prop-
erty which it conveyed to Cedar City on January 31, 
1958 (subsequent to the tax lien date of January 1, Utah 
Code i\nno. 1953, 59-10-3; but prior to the assessment 
date of April 15, Utah Code Anno. 1953, 59-5-4, and 
prior to the levy date which falls between the last Mon-
day in July and the second Monday in August, Utah 
Code Anno. 1953, 59-9-6) was an invalid assessment and 
levy for the reason that Cedar City is immune from taxa-
tion under the provision of Article 13, section 2, of the 
Utah Constitution which provides in part " ... The prop-
erty of the state, counties, cities, towns, school districts, 
1nunicipal corporations . . . shall be exempt from taxa-
tion." 
It is on this basis that Utah Parks Company seeks 
a refund of the taxes from Iron County to whom it made 
payment. Utah Parks Company cites various authorities 
for the proposition that the tax was invalid, including 
Gill·mor v. Dale, 27 lTtah 372, 75 P. 932 ( 1904). It is 
Cedar City's position that this case represents the law 
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3 
of this state, that the ovenvhelming weight of authority 
is in accord with this case and that this is the only logical 
conclusion to be reached in vie"'' of the immunity granted 
by the constitution. 
The reasoning underlying Gillmor v. Dale is that there 
is no valid tax and no valid tax lien unless the property 
concerned is in a taxable status while the statutorily re-
quired steps, particularly assessment and levy, are per-
formed. Prior to that time, the property may be subject 
to an inchoate security right but this right does not vest 
unless the tax is finally and lawfully determined by the 
various tax steps required by statute. 
In its attempt to navigate a safe passage between 
Scylla and Charybdis, lJtah Parks Company has pre-
sented its case for the invalidity of the tax with some 
understandable restraint. Therefore Cedar City feels that 
an additional submission of authorities and discussion 
may be helpful. 
Several courts have examined the tax implications 
involved where property comes into the hands of a tax 
exempt entity subsequent to the tax lien date but prior 
to the completion of the assessment and levy. Of such 
cases decided by courts with the authority to speak for 
the state concerned, the following support the theory 
that such a transfer prevents the relation back of the 
assessment and levy to the lien date with the result that 
no valid tax is imposed : 
Territory v. Perrin, 9 Ariz. 316, 83 P. 361 ( 1905); 
City of Laurel v. Weems~ 100 Miss. 335, 56 So. 451 
(1911); 
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Madison County v. School District No. 2, 148 Neb. 
218, 27 N.W.2d 172 ( 1947); 
Cachet v. Neu' Orleans, 52 La.Ann. 813, 27 So. 348 
(1900); 
State v. Champion Fibre Co., 204 N.C. 295, 168 S.E. 
207 ( 1933) ; 
City of Portland v. Muttnomah County, 135 Or. 469, 
296 P. 48 (1931); 
Clity and County of Denver v. Tax Research Bureau, 
101 Colo. 140, 71 P.2d 809 (1937). 
While it would be foolish to warrant that it does not 
exist, research has failed to reveal any presently reliable 
case in point from a court with the power to speak for 
its state that holds to the contrary. In addition, it appears 
that the great weight of authority goes even one large step 
further. The following cases support the proposition that 
even where a valid tax lien has accrued by virtue of the 
accomplishment of all needed tax processes prior to the 
acquisition of the property by a tax exempt entity, such 
acquisition voids the prior valid lien: 
State v. Maricopa County, 38 Ariz. 347, 300 P. 175 
( 1931) ; 
People v. Chambers, 37 Cal.2d 552, 233 P.2d 557 
( 1951) ; 
Board of Capital Managers v. Brasie, 72 Colo. 153, 
210 P. 63 (1922); 
State v. Canyon County, 181 P. 2d 196 (Idaho 1947); 
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State v. Minidoka County, 50 Idaho 419, 298 
P. 366 ( 1931) ; 
Harlan v. Blair, 251 Ky. 51, 64 S.W.2d 434 ( 1933); 
Collector v. Revere Bldg., 276 Mass. 576, 177 N.E. 
577 (1931); 
Davis v. Biloxi, 183 Miss. 340, 184 So. 76 ( 1938) ; 
McAnally v. Little River Drainage District, 28 S.W.2d 
650 (Mo. 1930); 
Housing Authority v. Bjork, 109 Mont. 552, 98 P.2d 
324 (1940) 
Sch1nitz v. New Mexico State Tax Commission, 55 
N.M. 320, 232 P.2d 986 ( 1951); 
State v. Divide County, 68 N.D. 708, 283 N.W. 184 
,( 1938) ; 
State v. Snohomish County, 71 Wash. 320, 128 P. 
667 ( 1912). 
The per curiam opinions in State v. Salt Lake County, 
96 Utah 464, 85 P.2d 851 ( 1938) and State v. Duchesne 
County, 96 Utah 482, 85 P.2d 860 ( 1938) do hold to the 
.contrary, but as pointed out by Utah Parks Company 
at pages 20 and 21 of its brief, these cases are readily dis-
tinguishable from the present controversy for there all 
the tax acts had been accomplished prior to the time 
the state acquired title to the property. Research sug-
gests that lJtah has little company in the position taken 
in these two cases. See, .i\nnotation, 158 A.L.R. 563, 565, 
569. Even State v. Salt !Jake County, at 858, points out 
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the distinction between it and the present type of contro-
versy. 
In the face of the almost nonexistent authority and 
reasoning to support the view that the tax was valid, 
Utah Parks Company suggests that the case of United 
States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274 ( 1941), if controlling, 
\vould require a finding that the tax was valid. (Utah 
Parks Company brief, page 17.) We submit that it is 
clear that the Alabama case is not controlling for it does 
not and cannot purport to state the la\v of Utah. 
With all due regard for the august body which uttered 
that decision, we respectfully point out that in a case 
turning on state law, the Supreme Court of the United 
States is in no stronger position than any state court 
purporting to divine the law of a sister jurisdiction. Even 
the Alabama authorities relied on by the Supreme Court 
are not in point, one dealing with railroads and the date 
an exemption begins, another dealing with a constitu-
tional prohibition against remission of taxes. The court, 
without giving persuasive reasons, declines to follow the 
prevailing view cited to it by the government. Although 
the court did not invalidate the liens involved, it did 
hold that the tax sales and certificates were invalid. Since 
the United States had not conveyed the property to 
others and since the state of Alabama was, by the effect 
of the decree, prevented from enforcing its lien, the true 
effect of the court's purported holding that the liens 
survived is open to conjecture. One wonders if the court's 
philosophy concerning state-federal relationships did not 
prompt this part of the decision - a political considera-
tion not germane to the instant case. 
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In any event, we respectfully submit that a careful 
comparison of the cases, including the Alabama case, 
\vill show that the over\vhelming weight of authority and 
the better reasoning support the view that in the instant 
case there was no lawfully assessed and levied tax on 
the prop~rty in question for the year 1958 and that Utah 
Parks Company is not entitled to reimbursement from 
Cedar City for the tax it negligently paid to Iron County. 
POINT II. 
ASSlJMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TAX 
MAY HAVE BEEN LA WJ:t,.ULL Y ASSESSED AND 
LE\TIED, CEDAR CITY CORPORATION IS NOT 
OBLIGATED TO REIMBURSE UTAH PARKS 
CONIPANY FOR 'THE ERRONEOUS PAYMENT 
OF SUCH TAX FOR UTAH PARKS COMPANY 
PAID AS A VOLUNTEER, THE PAYMENT DID 
NOT B:ENEFIT CEDAR CITY CORPORATION 
AND SUCH REPAYMENT MAY BE BEYOND THE 
SCOPE OF AUTHORITY OF CEDAR CITY COR-
PORATION. 
Without diminishing to any extent the contention that 
the tax was not lawfully assessed and levied, even if it were 
lawfully assessed and levied Utah Parks Company is still 
not in a position to demand reimbursement from Cedar 
City. Utah Parks Company did not give notice to Cedar 
City that it \vas going to pay the tax and demand reim-
bursement. Had it done so, Cedar City could have tested 
its rights in an entirely different legal environment and 
the tax could have been paid, if need be, with protest. 
Failure to notify Cedar City that Utah Parks Company 
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8 
intended to make a payment which it was not obligated 
to make and failure to pay under protest has placed Cedar 
City in an unasked for undesirable situation attributable 
solely to, we must assume, negligence on the part of 
Utah Parks Company employees or officers. The argu-
ment on page 22 of its brief that Utah Parks Company 
was justified in making the payment as it did is not per-
suasive because the deed places the burden on Cedar 
City directly and not upon anyone else, particularly a 
negligent volunteer. Nor does Utah Code Anno. 1953, 
59-1 0-1 assist them. It reads: 
Every tax has the effect of a judgment against 
the person, and every lien created by this title 
has the force and effect of an execution duly 
levied against all personal property of the delin-
quent. The judgment is not satisfied nor the lien 
removed until the taxes are paid or the property 
sold for the payment thereof. 
Mr. Justice Wolfe's unfortunate digression in his 
concurring opinion in Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 
P .2d 781, 788 ( 1946) wherein he opines that the above 
statutory provision may serve to make the tax obliga-
tion more than a lien or a charge on the land seems to 
ignore the last sentence of the provision which sets forth 
in the disjunctive two means of removing any such lien 
or obligation in the nature of a judgment against the 
delinquent -- payment of the taxes or sale of the proper-
ty for payment of the taxes. Title 59 of Utah Code Anno. 
1953, sets forth a detailed procedure for the collection 
of delinquent taxes by sale of the property concerned. 
We have not found, nor has Utah Parks Company cited, 
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any authority which permits any other type of action 
for the collection of delinquent taxes on realty. In view 
of the fact that the foreclosure procedure provided by 
law extinguishes any judgment or lien effect of the tax, 
it is difficult to think that Utah Parks Company had 
any justifiable reason for making payment of the tax 
at all, let alone without first notifying Cedar City. Utah 
Parks Company's assertion in the first full paragraph of 
page 23 of its brief that it may have had ample justifica-
tion for paying the tax first and a asking reimbursement 
later is not supported by the law. To the extent its state-
tnent seeks to bring in factual justification it is dehors' 
the record. 
Under these circumstances it is clear that Utah Parks 
Company was not required to make the payment to pro-
tect itself, that it jeopardized Cedar City's position by 
its voluntary payment without protest and that it is 
no\v asking Cedar City to act as an ad hoc insurer against 
negligence or mistake on the part of its employees or 
officers. It is quite possible that such a payment by Cedar 
City would be beyond its authority. See, for example, 
10 NlcQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §29.06 (3d ed. 
1950). 
CONCLlJSION 
Regardless of the decision of this court with refer-
ence to {Jtah Parks Company's request for a refund from 
Iron County, it is respectfully submitted that ( 1 ) the 
tax in dispute \vas not lawfully assessed and levied and 
therefore it does not come within the purview of the 
deed provision concenred and ( 2) even if it be deter-
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mined that the tax was lawfully assessed and levied, pay-
ment by Utah Parks Company without prior notice to 
Cedar City was the act of a volunteer which jeopardized 
Cedar City's position rather than benefiting it and re-
payment may be beyond the authority of the city. The 
judgment in favor of Cedar City should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. HARLAN BURNS 
25 East Lincoln Avenue 
Cedar City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant- Re-
spondent, Cedar City Cor-
poration. 
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